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Abstract 
The U.S, Navy submarine force entered World War II with a defective primary 
weapon system, the Mark XIV Torpedo.  It was developed in the mid 1920’s, but 
never adequately developmentally or operationally tested prior to entering full rate 
production.  After the inception of hostilities, submarine commanders reported 
multiple problems with malfunctioning torpedoes.  This case study presents the Mark 
XIV’s developmental history, initial combat performance, and the 21 month effort to 
find and remedy the three root causes that were significantly degrading the torpedo’s 
combat effectiveness. The study subsequently analyses the derived lessons learned 
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Introduction 
The Mark XIV torpedo started development in 1922, but the Navy Bureau of 
Ordnance (Bu Ord) did not get it fully operationally effective and suitable until the 
late summer of 1943, despite U.S. Navy submarines having taken it to war on 
December 7, 1941.  It is one of the saddest tales in all of Defense Acquisition and is 
the motivation for assembling this case study. 
I put together a Mark XIV torpedo case study in 1996 as a class presentation 
and have since supplemented that with a History Channel documentary that came 
out in 2001.  The subject of this case study is the Navy’s primary submarine-
launched torpedo at the inception of WWII—the Mark XIV.  In this case study, I 
discover lessons learned in requirements determination, particularly the danger of 
not reacting when the requirement changes, and also in developmental and 
operational testing.  The biggest lesson, as I will demonstrate in this case study, is 
the risk taken when adequate developmental and operational testing are not 
performed.  Another lesson learned is what happens when complaints from the field 
(or, in this case, from the fleet) are received that something is wrong with their 
equipment and those complaints are not taken seriously.  Developmental activities 
that try to blame operator incompetence or laziness for poor hardware performance 
without conducting a thorough investigation of operator concerns put American 
warfighters’ lives at risk. 
In the case of the performance problems experienced by the Mark XIV 
torpedo, there were three separate root causes that I will discuss as the case study 
unfolds.  I look at the Mark XIV torpedo from its gestation in 1922 until the last of the 
three root causes was discovered and “fixed” in the late summer of 1943.   
Obviously, with Pearl Harbor occurring in December 1941, it is clear that it took an 
inordinately long time (21 months) to finally fix the Mark XIV torpedo so that it was a 
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merchant ships against which it was primarily targeted.  The trouble-shooting 
challenge was exacerbated because the three root causes masked each other. 
The Germans fought with torpedo-firing submarines in a very successful (at 
least initially) Battle of the Atlantic in WWI that almost severed the sea lines of 
communication (SLOC) to Great Britain.  They were poised to severely interrupt the 
war effort by constraining food, ammunition, and war supplies en route to Great 
Britain because they sank so many Allied merchant ships prior to the implementation 
of the convoy system.  The U-boat successes in WWI validated the potential 
effectiveness of the torpedo-firing submarine as both a tactical and a strategic 
weapon for future wars. 
In WWI, the torpedo-firing submarine was a strategic weapon in the sense 
that the Germans were trying to blockade England and the Allies.  It was projected to 
become a tactical weapon in WWII because the U.S. Navy’s plan was that the next 
generation of U.S. submarines that were being developed during the 1920s (which 
became known as the “fleet boat”) would operate with the U.S. battleship fleets. 
In the 1920s, the U.S. battle fleet consisted of battleships that had maximum 
speeds of in the range of 18–22 knots.  The fleet boat submarine that was designed 
in the 1920s was developed against a requirement to achieve a surface speed of at 
least 21 knots so that it could keep up with the battle fleet.  It was envisioned that 
this fleet boat would be an auxiliary in battleship-to-battleship surface warfare and 
that U.S. submarines would be coordinated to go out and attempt to sink and 
damage the enemy’s battleships.  Therefore, with that concept as the initial 
requirement, torpedo efficacy against capital ships was to be the key to success.  
However, it turned out that the U.S. Navy undersea warfare community, for a 
number of different reasons, was not up to the task.  The biggest impediment was 
the insular nature of the Bu Ord’s torpedo program that was located on Goat Island 
at the Naval Torpedo Station, Newport, RI.  The Navy did not generally realize that 
its torpedo designs were somewhat archaic compared to those of the Europeans, 
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The Imperial Japanese Navy torpedoes devastated the U.S. surface fleet in 
the initial battles off of Salvo Island in August 1942, right after the U.S. Marine 
Corps’ amphibious invasion of Guadalcanal.  The U.S. lost so many ships that the 
Sailors came to call the area “Iron Bottom Sound.”  The vulnerability thus created led 
to the remainder of the fleet abruptly leaving Guadalcanal after only three days of 
partially unloading the logistics support for the 1st Marine Division.  The Japanese 
Navy’s night-fighting acumen and superior surface-launched torpedoes (known as 
the “Long Lance”) had destroyed much of the U.S. naval combat force, particularly 
its cruisers, in the preceding two nights of combat.  Japanese surface-launched 
torpedoes were 24 inches in diameter.  U.S. and Japanese submarine-launched 
torpedoes were both 21 inches in diameter.  The latter had 50% heavier warheads 
and higher energy fuel than did the Mark XIV.  Therefore, Japanese torpedoes were 
faster and considerably more destructive than the U.S. torpedoes.  The Japanese 
Navy’s successes basically left the supply fleet “denuded” of capital ships to defend 
themselves, and Vice Admiral Gromley felt that he had to withdraw, leaving MG 
Vandergrift and the 1st Marine Division with very little artillery and ammunition 
because these things were not yet unloaded and leaving them short on most other 
supplies and equipment. 
In fact, the Seabees built Henderson Field airfield primarily with captured 
Japanese equipment that they had been using to build their yet-to-be operational 
airfield when the U.S. landed.  To a significant extent, the Marines had to live off 
captured rations and other supplies. 
The MARK XIV was part of a family of three related U.S. torpedoes.  The U.S. 
had the surface-launched Mark XV torpedo that was carried by destroyers and by 
cruisers that were equipped with torpedo tubes.  The U.S. also had the air-launched 
Mark XIII torpedo as well as the submarine-launched Mark XIV torpedo. 
The Bu Ord in the interwar U.S. Navy was known informally as “the Gun 
Club.”  The Bu Ord no longer exists because the Naval Sea Systems Command 
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related organizations, such as the Bureau of Engineering (Bu Eng), the Bureau of 
Construction and Repair (Bu C & R), etc.  At both the time between the world wars 
as well as during WWII, the Bu Ord was probably the most powerful bureau in the 
Navy bureaucracy regarding ships, explosives, and weapons.  They were known as 
the Gun Club because their focus between the wars (actually even before WWI) had 
been on Dreadnaughts, which had evolved into battleships and were mounted with 
the largest possible guns.  During WWI, very few battleships had guns any larger 
than 14 inches.  The standard in WWII was 16 inches.  The Japanese had two illegal 
(that is, illegal under the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922) “super battleships” with 
guns slightly larger than 18 inches.  The basic interwar idea of naval warfare was 
that your battleships had to sink the enemy’s battleships; effective guns and gunnery 
acumen, of course, were absolutely essential for that.  The Bu Ord—although 
responsible for torpedoes, mines, and explosives, as well as for guns and 
projectiles—was primarily known as the Gun Club. 
In addition, the Bu Ord had become an elitist organization that received 
primarily the very highest ranked Naval Academy graduates to perform their shore 
tours there.  After their initial sea tour, many of them were sent to graduate school.  
In the case of the Newport Torpedo Station, they were sent to the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT), which featured a torpedo curriculum and torpedo labs 
that worked with the Navy at Goat Island.  One of the officers sent to that course 
was a submarine-qualified lieutenant named Ralph W. Christy who, when he 
finished his master’s degree, was assigned to Goat Island.  He was placed in charge 
of what today would be called a “black project” to develop a magnetic influence 
exploder for the U.S. submarine-launched torpedo, the Mark XIV. 
The first question that arises is why did the U.S. need a high-technology 
magnetic influence exploder instead of just a conventional contact exploder that 
would initiate the warhead when a torpedo impacted the hull of a targeted ship?  
Torpedoes had been around for a long time; it was a primitive “torpedo” carried by 
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warship in Charleston Harbor, SC, during the Civil War.  The torpedo was 
temporarily attached to the submarine and then to an enemy warship.  The Huntley 
ended up sinking herself after attaching its warhead to a Union man-of-war.  
Torpedoes had been slowly developed worldwide in the late 19th century, and by the 
advent of WWI, the Germans and the British had pretty effective torpedoes.   
Torpedoes were viewed by battleships as a threat, particularly those with 
torpedo boats (patrol torpedo boats or PT boats) and particularly because torpedo-
armed destroyers and cruisers were abundant in the world’s navies.   Therefore, 
battleships were being designed with what are called “torpedo blisters.”  This meant 
that outside of their armor belts, they had a second unarmored hull that was usually 
filled with drinking water and, once they had converted from coal, with fuel oil; it was 
designed to be a “sacrifice structure.”  If a torpedo with a contact exploder were to hit 
it, it would blow a hole in this outer hull that would leak out drinking water, oil, or 
whatever was stored in there, but it would protect the main hull of the battleship from 
being impacted by the torpedo.  The enemy would have to make a pretty lucky shot 
to put a second torpedo through the hole made by the first one and reach the 
primary hull; most battleships were built on this premise.  WWI battleships were very 
wide, and part of that width was the torpedo blisters.  A potential way around the 
torpedo blisters is to have a torpedo that explodes beneath the targeted ship.  
Figures 2–10 show pictures from the operational test of an Australian Mark 48 
advanced capability (ADCAP) Torpedo (built under license from the U.S.). 
 When an explosion takes place in water, particularly at depth, the water has 
a tamping effect in all directions except straight up because that is the path of least 
resistance.  When the torpedo warhead detonates, it is almost as if there is a lens 
that focuses the force of the torpedo’s explosion straight up. If a torpedo were to 
explode under the keel of a ship and all the force were focused upward, it would 
probably would break the keel, or at least do great damage.  The explosion might 
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keel of a smaller ship, and it certainly would create very significant damage inside 
the battleship in the areas where the torpedo exploded. 
This idea of developing a magnetic influence exploder was based on attempts 
by the Germans in WWI to make a magnetic influence–triggered sea mine.  This 
emerging technology was very appealing in terms of the torpedo’s efficacy, or 
“combat effectiveness” in today’s lexicon, against an enemy battleship.  The idea 
was that the magnetic field inherent in the battleship would be sensed by the torpedo 
and used to detonate it at the proper time.  There were a lot of fallacies with that 
concept, which I will discuss later.   
Figure 1 below provides the background of a test that demonstrates the 
destructive force of a torpedo detonating directly under the keel of a warship.   
Figures 2–10 are a series of photographs of a 1999 Royal Australian Navy 
operational test of an Australia-manufactured version of a U.S. Navy–designed Mark 
48 torpedo that dramatically demonstrate the destructive power of a warhead 
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Figure 1. Test Background 
(Navy Undersea Warfare Center, 1999) 
Figure 2 is a picture of the obsolete full-sized Australian destroyer that served 
as the test target.  Everything useful was removed from the destroyer—all turrets, 
depth charges, secondary armament, etc.  The configuration is visible in subsequent 
photos.  Figure 2 shows the target ship sitting dead in the water waiting to be 
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Figure 2. Destroyer Prior to Detonation 
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Figure 3 is a photograph of the moment the torpedo was detonated.  The 
photograph shows that smoke has been blown out of the stack because of the 
power of the explosion, and it shows that water is starting to erupt on either side of 
the ship.  In Figure 3, the ship already appears to have had its keel broken because 
the bow and the stern are lower than the center of the ship. 
 
Figure 3. Initial Reaction 
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Figure 4 is a photograph of a few seconds, maybe even milliseconds, later.  
The explosion has propagated even further, and the power of the torpedo warhead’s 
explosive is visible as it goes straight up through the bowels of the ship along the 
center line—and it only gets worse. 
 
Figure 4. Further Damage 
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Figure 5 clearly shows that the back of the destroyer has been broken.  The 
extensive level of damage that is taking place is obvious.   
 
Figure 5. The Keel Has Broken 
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Figure 6 shows that the level of damage is now catastrophic. 
 
Figure 6. Bow and Stern Sections Separate 
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As the smoke clears in the photograph in Figure 7, it is clear that the 
destroyer has broken into two halves and that the stern section is about to sink. 
 
Figure 7. The Stern Begins to Sink 
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Figure 8 shows that the observation made in Figure 7 is accurate: the stern 
section is headed to “Davey Jones’ Locker.”  The photograph in Figure 8 is a close-
up of the destroyer as it slips beneath the waves. 
 
Figure 8. The Stern Slips Under the Waves 
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Figure 9 is a close-up photograph of the residual debris field. 
 
Figure 9. The Stern Disappears 
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Figure 10 is a photograph of the bow section of the ship. As the photograph 
shows, it is not economically repairable.  The damage is so bad that by the time the 
Australian Navy would have tried to salvage what is left there in order to rebuild a 
new ship around it, it would have been better to have started from scratch.  Plus, 
ship designs evolve, and if this were an older ship, it would probably be better from a 
cost-effectiveness standpoint to acquire a “latest and greatest” warship of a similar 
class to replace this one.  In this test, the bow section actually sank a few hours after 
the photograph in Figure 10 was taken. 
 
Figure 10. The Residual Bow Section 
(Navy Undersea Warfare Center, 1999) 
Coming back to the Mark XIV’s developmental history, there were significant 
technical challenges facing the Mark VI magnetic exploder.  First, there was  the 
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equator in the very early 1930s that attempted to characterize the magnetic field of 
(in this case) the heavy cruiser Indianapolis.  Ironically, this cruiser was the same 
Indianapolis that took the “Fat Man” Plutonium bomb to Tinian Island in July 1945 
and, after departing the island, was somehow lost track of by the Navy and sunk by 
a Japanese submarine.  The crew spent about four days in shark-infested waters 
before the Navy realized that the Indianapolis was missing.  A search was mounted, 
the cruiser’s sinking site found, and the remaining survivors finally rescued.   
Second, although they did conduct this one magnetic field test, Bu Ord did not 
readily realize that in divergent parts of the world, the magnetic fields have different 
characteristics and that it is very hard to capture those—this was particularly true 
with the immature technologies of the time..  At that point in time, the magnetic 
influence exploder was impractical, but Newport did not realize it; Lieutenant Christy 
pushed it through in ignorance.  Due to a shortage of funding, Bu Ord did only 
limited, but very inadequate, developmental testing.  Based on only two live fire 
shots (one of which failed), they declared the Mark XIV torpedo developmental 
program (complete with the Mark VI magnetic exploder) a success and began 
producing the torpedo in quantity. 
The Mark XIV was constrained to a warhead 21 inches in diameter (the same 
diameter as the torpedo) because all the torpedo launching tubes that the U.S. had 
in its Navy at that time were 21 inches.  With that large of an infrastructure 
investment in launchers, the Navy had no choice but to have the same size torpedo 
that the launcher was built for. 
Therefore, Bu Ord had to make some trades in the requirements between 
speed, range, and warhead size in order to optimally engage moving targets.  The 
faster a target is moving, the harder it is to hit.  The Mark XIV torpedo ended up 
having two speeds: one a slower 31.5-knot speed that permitted long-range 
engagements of up to 9,000 yards, and the other a higher 46-knot speed for shorter 
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the speed of the target over a long range with a slow torpedo were miss-estimated, 
the chances of achieving a hit would be poor.   
There was also an issue on the propulsion for the torpedo.  The U.S. ended 
up using a steam torpedo where a chemical reaction was supposed to be used in 
order to create steam to drive turbines that, in turn, drove the propellers.  The result 
was a torpedo with a sizeable wake of gas bubbles that told anyone being fired upon 
that coming right at them was a torpedo. In many cases, sighting the wake would 
give the target time to maneuver and avoid the torpedo entirely.  The physical size of 
the Mark XIV was limited by the existing U.S. Navy torpedo-launching infrastructure, 
and so in order to carry enough fuel to attain the required range, the warhead’s 
lethal mechanism was restricted to only about 500 pounds of TNT (initially).  This 
relatively lightweight warhead was another reason why the magnetic influence 
exploder was adopted; it optimized what explosive weight could be carried by 
theoretically detonating more destructively directly under the keel of the enemy 
target. 
The Japanese, on the other hand, used a fuel of liquid hydrogen peroxide that 
yielded much more energy and gave their torpedoes considerably more range than 
those of the U.S. or, in the trade-off, much more speed.  Because of their more 
energetic fuel, the Japanese could trade-off fuel capacity to increase the size (and, 
therefore, lethality) of their warheads to about 750 pounds.   
There were also issues with depth control.  Depth control on the Mark XIV 
was very complicated because of the complex hydrodynamic control subsystem that 
Bu Ord had developed without adequate testing.  Due to very limited testing, the 
Navy did not know that it had a depth control problem with the Mark XIV until 
operational skippers started reporting their suspicions at the onset of WWII. 
There were also logistics and maintenance issues.  Eli Whitney and his 
concept of interchangeable parts did not apply to torpedoes.  Critics alleged that the 
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many cases, were custom-matched and, therefore, not readily interchangeable 
between different torpedoes.  The parts were similar, but each torpedo was carefully 
machined to very tight tolerances.  This process resulted in the lack of a universal 
set of interchangeable parts, which added markedly to the logistics burden placed 
upon Sailors.  In addition, functions such as the depth control, which was very 
sensitive, required frequent adjustments and a lot of skill to maintain properly. 
In order to help clarify why critics accused Goat Island of “splendid isolation” 
(Bridges & Weiss, 2000), let me also provide a little political history.  During WWI, 
the Navy activated a second torpedo factory in Old Town Alexandria, VA, which 
today is a boutique and art gallery.  At the end of WWI, congressional delegations 
from the New England states of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island—
worried about jobs and influence—persuaded Congress and the DoN to close the 
Alexandria torpedo station in order to have only one torpedo station, which was to be 
at Newport on Goat Island.   
Everything was consolidated at Goat Island by about 1919.   Now, add a 
black project, add an island well out in Newport harbor with severe security 
restrictions on who could even land on it, and add inadequate developmental and 
test funding and it creates a prescription for potential developmental disaster. 
During WWII, the Navy reopened the Alexandria torpedo factory and also built 
an additional one on the West Coast at Keyport, WA, which is right next to Bangor 
on the Olympic Peninsula, where the ballistic missile submarine base is today.  
Keyport it is one of two bases that hosts the Navy Undersea Warfare Center. 
Because of the torpedo shortage that arose in light of the 1938 Munich 
Agreement between the British, French, and Hitler, and because of the likelihood of 
a WWII, the U.S. Navy suddenly realized that it had to rapidly expand production of 
the Mark XIV.  These expensive, difficult-to-machine torpedoes had been produced 
by Newport at a very low rate because of cost and production constraints, and the 
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Therefore, at the outbreak of World War II, submarine captains were told to 
exclusively use the magnetic exploder to economize upon torpedoes so that a 
submarine could expend just one torpedo per target and stretch the existing 
stockpile as far as possible. 
The direction to exclusively use the magnetic exploder made the Navy 
dependent in combat upon an inadequately tested and, as it turned out, unreliable 
magnetic exploder.  Submarine attacks also suffered from premature detonations.  
There were several reasons for that.  First, the torpedo did not “arm” until it was a 
safe distance from the submarine in case it did explode accidentally.  Second, 
skippers’ ignorance of the differential worldwide magnetic fields meant that in some 
areas of the world when the magnetic exploder armed, it immediately went off 
because it sensed the magnetic field signal for which it was programmed.  However, 
this signal was not coming from an enemy ship; instead, it was coming from the 
earth. 
A third major deficiency appeared when submarine captains, seeing 
torpedoes run under a target without detonating, started setting them to run 
shallower because they wanted to rely on the contact exploder.  However, they 
found that even when set shallow, the torpedoes did not explode and appeared to 
run under their targets.  After receiving many complaints, Bu Ord sent a team of 
experts to Pearl Harbor in late January 1942 to inspect the torpedoes and 
submarines.  The team talked to the crews and skippers and concluded that poor 
torpedo performance was an operator maintenance and training problem and was 
aggravated by unaggressive skippers.  They asserted that the problem was not the 
torpedoes, and they did not do any further empirical testing on the Mark XIV torpedo 
at that time. 
A report about this visit that was made by a senior COMSUBPAC staff officer 
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The Bureau of Ordnance flew a [team headed by] torpedo expert, Lieutenant 
Commander Walker, all the way out from Washington to investigate torpedo 
problems.  He put us through rigorous drills preparing torpedoes for firing and 
in routine maintenance procedures.  Near the end of our checklist  in getting 
one of the torpedoes ready, Walker interrupted the proceedings, made a 
couple of checks, then directed me to lock the gyros in place.  I looked … and 
noted that he had turned the gyro backwards [a Mark XIV gyro could be 
locked in a reverse position and result in an erratic run.]  I turned the gyro to 
the correct alignment, locked it in place and told Walker that we preferred to 
attack the enemy ships instead of our own.  His face fell half a foot. … Walker 
did not point out a single fault in our preparations and maintenance 
procedures; nevertheless, [his] report, in summary, placed all of the blame for 
torpedo problems on fleet boat personnel.  As a result, the Bureau of 
Ordnance reaffirmed their position that the Mark XIV torpedoes ran at their 
set depth. (Blair, 1975, p. 170)  
At this point I need to add one other thing that brings me back to the original 
fleet boat requirement.  The fleet boat, being designed to fight alongside the 
battleships, had only a secondary mission as a commerce-raider in its strategic role 
of strangling the enemy by cutting its sea line of communication.  That concept was 
knocked in the head shortly after the Washington Naval Conference of 1921 and its 
resultant treaty.  The intent behind the treaty was to try and stop a growing naval 
arms race, and it was only reluctantly agreed to by the Japanese, who it turned out 
never lived up to it anyway.  The treaty restricted battleships and some other capital 
ships to a 5-5-3 ratio.  For every five battleships that the U.S. and Great Britain were 
allowed, the Japanese were allowed to have three.  The Germans were not allowed 
to have any battleships under the Treaty of Versailles. 
The U.S. had two battle cruisers under construction at the time of the 
Washington Naval Conference of 1921.  Under the terms of the treaty, the U.S. was 
not only going to have to scrap some old battleships but also it was going to have to 
scrap the two battle cruisers that were still under construction.  Battle cruisers are 
now a defunct class of ship, but an anecdote about a British battle cruiser will help 
me illustrate what they were. 
The HMS Hood (the pride of the British Navy between WWI and WWII) was 
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a battleship, except the Hood was much more lightly armored, and that weight 
savings allowed it to have a much higher speed.  The idea was that if it could reach 
35 knots when regular battleships could only achieve about 20 knots, then its speed 
would make it very difficult to hit and would enable it to quickly escape out of range, 
meaning that it also did not need that thicker armor.  In 1940, a couple of salvos 
from the German battleship Bismarck proved otherwise, and the Hood went down 
with a loss of a couple thousand men; there were only three survivors.   
The U.S. Navy decided to convert their two partially built battle cruisers into 
another class of ship.  The Navy decided that since it had developed an embryonic 
air arm, it would convert these two battle cruisers into aircraft carriers because the 
latter were not limited under the treaty signed at the Washington Naval Conference 
of 1921.  Those two battle cruisers became the aircraft carriers Saratoga and 
Lexington.  These two aircraft carriers had bows that were not squared off, but 
instead were tapered and rounded.  They also had huge “islands” set to the 
starboard side of the ships that contained the facilities to operate the ships and 
conduct flight operations.  Mounted next to them were several turrets of dual-
purpose 5-inch guns that were used both for anti-aircraft purposes and against 
surface targets. 
Because the Saratoga and the Lexington retained the engines of the original 
battle cruisers, they had fully loaded speeds of 33–35 knots, much faster than 1920s 
battleships.  During war games in the late 1920s, the carrier battle group simulated a 
Japanese attack on the Panama Canal; even with their contemporary biplanes, they 
were able to sneak up during the war games and attack the canal by simulating 
bombing the locks and ruining the canal, closing it so that it would not have been 
available for use in time of war.  That seriously alarmed the Navy, and it decided that 
it had better increase the speed of the battleships so that they could accompany the 
carriers.  Budgets were very limited between the wars; however, they did design the 
North Carolina class, which had a speed of 27 knots; she was launched in 1939 and 
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took her around to all the port cities on the East and West Coasts.  She was 
specifically designed to go through the Panama Canal, which today we call being a 
“Panamax,” the maximum size that will go through the locks.  Her sister battleship, 
the Washington, was commissioned in late 1941. (Sumrall 1988) 
Later U.S. battleships of other classes were slightly larger and slightly faster 
than the North Carolina, culminating in the Iowa-class battleships: the Iowa, the New 
Jersey, the Missouri, and the Wisconsin, all of which could achieve over 33 knots.  
The four were all reactivated for the Korean War; some of them were reactivated for 
the Vietnam War; and President Reagan brought all of them out of mothballs during 
his administration.  The updated New Jersey was still active for Desert Shield and 
Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991, respectively.  They are all back in mothballs again, 
or, in many cases, they have become monuments.  The Missouri, of course, is now 
a monument and moored next to the Arizona Memorial in Pearl Harbor. 
In terms of an interwar fleet boat, if the Navy were going to have fleets of 
aircraft carriers accompanied by fast battleships, the fleet boat submarine simply 
could not keep up.  The physics of getting the diesel engines of the time large 
enough for submarines to keep up at 30 knots would have left no room for the 
electric batteries required for the boat to work as a submersible; therefore, achieving 
the new battleship speed just was not practical.  The mission for the submarine in 
the late 1920s and early 1930s had to change from being an auxiliary to the 
battleship versus battleship battle.  When the speed of the fleet increased to the 
point that the submarines could not keep up, then the main mission of the submarine 
became a strategic one as a commerce raider, and the Navy did not need a high-risk 
magnetic exploder in a torpedo being used to defeat relatively fragile enemy 
merchant ships. 
In reality, the extra expense of the magnetic exploder probably was neither 
required nor necessary.  However, the U.S. Navy, for whatever reasons, simply did 
not adjust the torpedo requirement.  Therefore, the Mark VI magnetic exploder 
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any further and, therefore, when the war started, the Navy had terrible problems with 
torpedoes not sinking ships.  In 45 separate attacks during the first weeks of combat 
in the defense of Luzon, at least 96 Mark XIV torpedoes were fired for a total of only 
three Japanese ships sunk (Bridges & Weiss, 2000).  The submarine community in 
the Pacific was deeply disappointed by their failure to sink more ships.  The below 
quote is from a History Channel documentary and highlight the frustration of the 
submariners: (Bridges & Weiss, 2000) 
Submarine commanders blamed the lack of success on two primary causes:  
Faulty torpedoes that ran too deep and torpedoes that were hitting the targets 
but not exploding.  There were a lot of reports of deep-running torpedoes or 
suspected deep-running torpedoes because proving that they are running 
deep is difficult.  And the Bureau of Ordnance was saying well, you guys are 
not shooting straight. 
Well in those days, they took an attitude that well maybe you are right 
or maybe you are wrong, and we lost a lot of good skippers of submarines 
because they were disbelieved.  We pretty much believed the sound 
operator—that 80% percent believed the sound operator who would say that 
he can hear them hitting the target.  So most of what we thought was 
tremendous frustration.  Not only that, but we felt that we were taking such 
great risk with our own lives for nothing.  It was bad on morale. 
At Pearl Harbor, Rear Admiral R. H. English sided with the Bureau of 
Ordnance in placing the blame on the submariners’ lack of initiative.  To be 
Commander of the Bureau of Ordnance was very important and was a 
stepping stone to even higher commands of flag rank so the power of the 
Bureau of Ordnance was considerable and that is one of the reasons not to 
challenge its favorite submarine weapon, the Mark XIV torpedo. 
In Western Australia, however, Rear Admiral Charles Lockwood took 
his submarine captains’ complaints seriously.  On June 20, 1942, outside the 
harbor in King George Sound, in southwest Australia, RADM Lockwood test 
fired torpedoes against moored fishing nets.  Although more than 800 
torpedoes had been fired in combat, this was the first controlled test since 
1926.  The firing proved to Lockwood’s own satisfaction that the Mark XIV 
was running on average 11 feet deeper than set.  Washington ridiculed the 
test.  The immediate reaction from the Bureau of Ordnance was that you did 
not have the torpedoes trimmed right.  The weight distribution wasn’t right.  
Furious, RADM Lockwood repeated the test.  The results were the same.  
Finally, the Bureau of Ordnance ordered its own investigation into the depth 
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conceded that the Mark XIV depth control mechanism had been improperly 
designed and tested [emphasis added]. (Bridges & Weiss, 2000) 
The task of incorporating the necessary modification was given to the fleet, 
but even with torpedoes now running at the proper depth, sinkings did not 
dramatically increase.  Further complaints about premature detonation, erratic runs, 
and defective torpedoes fell on deaf ears.  The magnetic exploder became the 
primary suspect in the minds of the crews and captains.  The following quote is from 
also from the History Channel documentary and highlights the frustration of the 
submariners and the various flag officers as the Mark XIV continued to be defective: 
(Bridges & Weiss, 2000) 
 
Rear Admiral Ralph Christy, who took over command of submarines in 
Australia when Vice Admiral Lockwood was transferred to Pearl Harbor, 
adamantly refused to consider magnetic exploder defects.  Not surprisingly, 
as RADM Christy had been responsible for its design while in the Bureau of 
Ordnance.  He specifically ordered his submarine crews not to tamper with 
the magnetic exploder. (Bridges & Weiss, 2000) 
 Finally, in June 1943, Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander of the 
Pacific Fleet, ordered the deactivation of magnetic exploders on all torpedoes.  
But the submarine’s success rate did not improve.  Instead, the number of 
torpedo failures seemed to increase.   
The Bureau of Ordnance in the meantime had corresponded with 
Albert Einstein at Princeton University on a variety of issues including torpedo 
detonation.  Einstein was paid $25/day as a consultant and quickly 
understood the problem.  The contact exploder’s firing pin located in the very 
front warhead was deforming on impact before it could detonate the 
explosion. 
Einstein’s immediate suggestion was to add a space at the front of the 
warhead providing an additional cushion to absorb the initial shock.  The 
Navy never pursued Einstein’s suggestion and once again the submariners 
had to find their own solution.  
 The torpedo controversy came to a head in July 1943 when the USS 
Tanosha received intelligence that a large Japanese tanker would pass 
through her patrol area the next morning.  They fired four torpedoes from 
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The skipper was about to cry and the XO and I said ‘Captain, this ship was 
tracking right on course with the speed and course we got it exactly right.’  He 
said ‘We will fire two more torpedoes at its stern and I will angle my 
periscope.’  We fired at it at 4,000 yards which is two miles with one miss and 
one that hit its stern and blew its stern up and it could not move again.  Well, 
he sat there.  We fired, over the next three to four hours, 12 more—one at a 
time.  We fired one side; we would go round to the other side.  Consternation 
and frustration was extreme. 
None of the 12 torpedoes exploded.  The Americans were finally 
chased away by Japanese ships sent to help the beleaguered tanker.  Dan 
Daskey, Tanosha’s Captain, saved his last torpedo as conclusive evidence 
that something was very wrong. 
Now Vice Admiral Lockwood had to accept that yet another component 
of the Mark XIV, the contact exploder, was also defective.  The sheer cliffs on 
uninhabited Kavalai Island southwest of Maui provided the final piece of the 
exploder puzzle.  On August 31, 1943, as a Navy patrol plane circled 
overhead, three torpedoes were fired against Kavalai’s underwater cliffs.  The 
first and second torpedoes detonated; the third was a dud.  A Navy diver went 
down in probably one of the most under-heralded and most heroic things that 
had been done in the course of the war.  He went down and put a line on a 
live warhead that had not exploded and they fished it up and then they took 
the damn thing apart. 
Finally, they found out what was causing the trouble.  There was a little 
ring that was just too light and if you hit too hard it would just crush, but if you 
hit it a glancing blow it was just right.  Well all they did was make a little 
change in that and they turned out a couple on the lathe, and tried it out, and 
it worked like a charm. 
The problems that had plagued the Mark XIV torpedo since the start of 
the war had finally been corrected.  The date was October 1943.  The first two 
years of WWII were the most frustrating of times for the silent service.  But by 
the end of 1943, torpedo performance had improved dramatically. 
During the entire war, approximately 15,000 torpedoes of all kinds 
were fired.  Despite a disastrous beginning, US submarines while comprising 
less than 2% of the Navy’s wartime commitment essentially accounted for 
over 5 million tons of shipping and 55% of all Japanese vessels lost. (Bridges 
& Weiss, 2000) 
It took 21 months into WWII before the three root cause defects in the Mark 
XIV were finally identified and corrected.  In all seriousness, God only knows how 
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Mark XVIII electric torpedo became available, had very prominent wakes that 
showed where the submarine was when it fired the torpedo. Then, because the 
submarines could not adequately defend themselves, they were sunk.  It just 
boggles my mind that it took as long as it did.  
RADM Christie had to receive an order directly from the Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO) to deactivate his magnetic exploders because he was not going 
to do it even with Fleet Admiral Nimitz’s order.  He had also refused Lockwood’s 
orders.  Some admirals might risk refusing to obey another admiral’s orders, but 
nobody dared to cross Fleet Admiral King, the CNO.  
Production finally met demand in 1944 with the activation of not only 
commercial industry sources but also the reopening of the Alexandria factory and 
the inauguration of the new Keyport torpedo station. 
Post-WWII analyses found that the Japanese surface-launched, 24-inch, 
Long Lance torpedo had double the warhead weight and range of the Mark XIV, and 
at a much higher speed—almost double the speed.  The Japanese achieved that by 
using a more volatile (at least the Bu Ord called it volatile) liquid hydrogen peroxide 
fuel.  The Navy had repeatedly rejected this as too dangerous because it was 
worried about fumes affecting the crew.  However, there was no post-WWII record 
found of any Japanese incident due to the use of hydrogen peroxide as torpedo fuel. 
As fallout from the Mark XIV root cause analysis process, the Chief of the Bu 
Ord, Admiral Blandy, signed and published the following rather remarkable 
memorandum in early 1944: 
Even with the relatively meager funds available in the time of peace, much of 
the work now being done after more than a year and a half of war could, and 
should, have been accomplished years ago.  That the work was not 
accomplished during peace, or earlier during the war, or so far as the 
Bureau’s records disclose that no one either at the Bureau or at Newport 
apparently questioned the inadequacy of the design without such tests, 
shows a lack of practical appreciation of the problems involved which is 
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both the Bureau of Ordnance and the Naval Torpedo Station, Newport.  The 
Chief of the Bureau therefore directs that as a matter of permanent policy, no 
service torpedo device ever be adopted as standard until it has been tested 
under conditions simulating as nearly as possible those which will be 
encountered in battle.1 
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Lessons Learned 
Generically speaking, the project manager (PM) and the user promulgating 
the requirement need to constantly reassess the required capability and make sure 
that what they are building is what is actually needed.  For example, in the case of 
the Mark XIV, in most instances, the magnetic exploder with its complexities, risk, 
and expense was no longer needed because the submarine was no longer a main 
element in the combat operations between capital ships.  Due to their shortfall in 
surface speed, fleet boats were now essentially commerce raiders with the strategic 
mission of strangling Japan for fuel, materiel, and food.  They performed this mission 
very well once the Bu Ord finally fixed all three major faults in the Mark XIV torpedo.   
Adequate developmental testing should have found all three failure modes 
prior to full-rate production.  The lack of adequate empirical testing was unjustifiable, 
but I am not sure Bu Ord realized that they were failing to conduct accurate tests 
and I am not sure they realized how much testing they really needed to do.  The 
inherent arrogance of the Gun Club and the “not invented here” syndrome, have 
been cited by some critics. (Bridges & Weiss, 2000)  Yes, a full-up Mark XIV torpedo 
did cost $10,000 in then-year dollars, but there certainly were ways that Newport 
could have had surrogates, engineering development models, and so forth to test 
the features of systems and subsystems.  They could have done a contact exploder 
test with a crane dropping a dummy warhead from a height that would match the 
momentum of an actual perpendicular impact of a torpedo against the hull of a ship.  
VADM Lockwood actually had this done at Pearl Harbor to confirm the results of the 
cliff tests and to develop an interim solution.  There were a lot of things they could 
have done, but they did not. 
The arrogance of the Gun Club, particularly the Newport Torpedo Station, at 
least as viewed by much of the rest of the Navy, was legendary.  They simply 
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inferiors in the fleet.  The result was disastrous in terms of the lives unnecessarily 
lost in submarines that could not defend themselves because of defective torpedoes. 
If there had then been an operational testing law and if the Navy had been 
forced to do adequate, independently evaluated operational testing, the Mark XIV 
would not have gone to war in 1941 with its three root cause deficiencies.  Today’s 
operational testers may sometimes over test equipment, but inadequate testing risks 
disaster.  Good operational testing that is intelligently applied and that does not also 
create requirements is very necessary.  
Another thing that the Navy has today with our readiness reporting and our 
logistics assessments is a system that forces equipment defects found by the fleet to 
surface early on.  Because submarines were so secret in WWII and because their 
patrol reports were need-to-know, there was not wide dissemination within the Navy 
of the seriousness of the torpedo problems that occurred early in the war.  If the 
Navy had had today’s formal post-deployment logistics assessments, and if it had 
had follow-on operational test and evaluation, the Navy probably would have 
discovered much earlier that it had a serious torpedo performance problem.  The 
Gun Club would have been overridden by the CNO, and the Navy would have 
solved this problem much earlier—if not prevented it altogether, assuming the 
resources could have been garnered in the late 1920s and early 1930s to actually do 
what needed to be done in order to absolutely prove the operational effectiveness 
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